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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relationship between the elderly population and public educational expenditures 
at the kindergarten, primary school, junior high school, and high school levels in Japan. We applied the dynamic 
estimation method to data on local expenditures on education after the late 1990s, when aging negatively im-
pacted educational expenditure in Japan. The estimation results indicate that the elderly are unlikely to support 
an increase in current expenditures that constitute a considerable fraction of payroll at any educational level. 
However, they display a positive attitude toward capital expenditures which mainly comprised construction costs 
for a relatively higher educational level. 
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1. Background and objective  
Japan’s population is aging faster than any other developed country. According to the National Census, Japan’s 
elderly population (aged 65 and above) will reach about 30% of all Japanese people in 10 years and 36% in 30 
years. How will this rapid aging impact government expenditures? According to the median voter theorem, 
preferences for the elderly in government decision-making have had an increased impact on determining 
government expenditures, matching the aging population. While government expenditure is expected to increase 
in programs that provide many direct benefits for the elderly, such as medical expenses and pensions, supporting 
government expenditures for the younger generation will theoretically become difficult too, since such programs 
will not likely provide direct benefits for the elderly. This paper focuses on educational expenditures, which is 
intuitively thought to lack direct benefits for the elderly, and analyzes the impact of aging on such expenditures. 
 
 
(Note1) The figures after 2020 are median estimated values. 
(Source) United Nations, "World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision Population Database." 
Fig.1：Percentage of people over 65 years old (seven major countries) 
 
To investigate the relationship between aging and educational expenditures, Miyaki and Kimura (2019) 
estimated Japanese prefectural data during the period 1975–2013. The paper is the first attempt in Japan to analyze 
every educational stage—from kindergarten to university—and shows differences in the impacts of aging on each 
stage during this period. In this paper, we develop the framework of Miyaki and Kimura (2019) and focus on 
educational expenditure categorized into two types: current spending or capital spending. Since the purpose of 
these two expenditure categories is different, elderly voter’s preference toward them might be, too. 
The proportion of elderly voters in Japan will steadily increase, with an attendant (expected) increase in the 
influence of their preferences in political decision-making. Therefore, understanding the positive or negative 
attitudes of the elderly toward educational expenditures, classified by type, will provide helpful information for 
local government officials deciding how to allocate limited public education resources. As far as we know, in the 
area of educational policy, there is limited research examining the influence of aging on educational expenditure 
focusing on its components, that is current and capital expenditures. In addition, we conduct a detailed analysis by 
applying dynamic perspective after carefully examining the data’s characteristics. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
China
French
Germany
Italy
Japan
England
U.S.A
%
CY
2. Theoretical background and previous research 
The impact of aging on educational expenditure is intuitively thought to be negative. That is, if the elderly are 
assumed to be egocentric, there would be support to increase social welfare and medical expenditures in regions 
where there is high proportion of the elderly, and less support for educational expenditure, since it provides little 
direct benefit for the elderly. On the other hand, Poterba (1998) and Harris et al. (2001), note five scenarios where 
the elderly are likely to support increased educational expenditure. 
First, the indirect benefits of positive externalities from education extend across generations, reaching the elderly 
as well. When young workers improve technology and productivity through education, their wages increase, 
leading to increased tax revenues, which can be expected to enrich social welfare benefits. Second, the elderly 
might be altruistic. For example, if they benefit from consumption by their children or grandchildren, for example 
in the apparel industry and at department stores as “the six pockets,” there are cases of relative generosity where 
the elderly will spend more on grandchildren. Third, the capitalization of the educational impact through an 
increase in value of a particular asset such as housing. In this case, if a person planning to purchase a house does 
not mind spending more in an area with a high-quality school, the elderly will no doubt support an increase in 
educational expenditures to maximize the asset value. Fourth, if elderly persons who do not want to pay taxes to 
enrich public education expenses move to regions where educational expenditures are low, educational spending 
in regions with lots of children is likely to remain high despite aging in the region. Fifth, the elderly think that 
public education is vital for children to adapt to life in society. This could include learning about aspects such as 
the duties of citizens and social norms through education that reduces the crime rate and stimulates economic 
activity.  
In theory, the relationship between aging and local educational expenditure can be either positive or negative, 
and empirical analysis has so far provided no conclusive evidence either way. Many studies have found a negative 
relationship (Table 1). Ladd and Murray (2001), however, did not find any significant result. Hoxby (1998) 
analyzed the impact at the school district level in Massachusetts from 1900 to 1990, finding a positive relationship 
between aging on public educational spending. In Japan, Ohtake and Sano (2010) also found a positive relationship 
between aging and compulsory education expenditure before the 1980s. Miyaki and Kimura (2019) found that 
before the 1990s, the elderly tended to support local public expenditure especially for high school and university. 
After the 2000s, however, the cohort’s preferences changed, and they have not been so willing to support such 
spending. The elderly even show a statistically significant negative attitude toward local public expenditures for 
kindergarten and the primary grades. 
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Table 1: Relationship between aging and educational expenses
 
(Note1) ＋ and － indicate positive and negative sign of coefficients of estimated parameters, respectively. 0 indicate 
"not significant". 
 
These previous studies offer insightful evidence. However, one point of view is not considered: the elderly’s 
preference where expenditure could differ by components. Given severe financial difficulties and a declining 
birthrate, the elderly may be adverse toward tangible spending such as new construction or expansion of school 
facilities, but tolerate increases in intangible spending that can easily affect the quality of education. On the other 
hand, even though it falls under the category of capital spending, some spending for indispensable projects such 
as maintaining aging buildings and upgrading earthquake-resistant construction could be supported by the elderly 
or spent regardless of their preferences. 
Some empirical research in the area of local government expenditures has often taken into consideration that 
point of view, analyzing expenditures by the components. For example, Miyazaki (2005) investigated the cost-
reduction effect caused by municipal mergers, classifying public expenditures by categories such as current costs 
and personnel costs. He found a different result for the cost-reduction effect depending on the components of each 
expenditure. Differences in the cost-reduction effect do not always correspond to voter’s preferences, since some 
expense items are relatively easy to cut, while others are not due to the rigidities or other characteristics of 
government spending. It is still possible, however, that government spending reflects a difference of a voter’s 
preferences. Aoki et al. (2012) investigated compulsory educational expenditures classified by the components in 
Japan and surveyed their time-series trend, focusing on the funding source and intergovernmental relationships. 
However, they do not empirically examine the determinants of educational expenditures. 
 
3. The data 
Pertaining to the financial source of educational expenditures, local governments, such as prefectures and 
municipalities, play a greater role than the national government. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology’s “Local Educational Expense Survey” reports that the proportion of educational 
Previous research Area Period Relationship between aging and educational expenses 
Poterba (1997, 1998) USA・State 1960～1990 －
Hoxby (1998) "USA・Massachusetts 
・School district" 1900〜1990 
～Beginning of the 20th century：＋ 
from 1990：－ 
Ladd and Murray (2001) USA・County 1970～1990 0 
Harris et al. (2001) USA・School district 1972～1992 －
Grob and Wolter (2007) "Switzerland 
・State／Territory" 1996〜2002 －
Borge and Rattso (2008) Denmark・Local government 1986〜1996 －
Arvate and Zoghbi (2010) Brazil・Local government 1991, 2000 － 
Ohtake and Sano (2010) Japan・Prefecture (Every 5 years) 1975〜2005 
〜1985：＋ 
1990～：－ 
Figlio and Fletcher (2012)  USA・School district 1970, 80, 90 － 
 
expenditure borne by national and local governments in Japan were 32% and 68%, respectively, in FY2016. These 
proportions consider a local allocation tax (LAT) to be local funds and calculate it by including the appropriated 
amount of tax allocated by local governments for educational expenditure, as the total expenditure borne by local 
governments. However, even if the appropriated amount of LAT is considered to be national government funds, 
the portion borne by local governments remains large and local public bodies have considerable discretion 
concerning educational expenditures. Thus, we analyze local level of educational expenditure. 
Even when referring to educational expenditure as a single item, the coverage of such expenditures is diverse. 
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ “Local Public Finance Survey,” educational 
expenditure can be categorized as: school expenses, general and administrative expenses, and social-educational 
expenses. In FY2017, their percent of educational expenditure was 84.2%, 6.0%, and 9.8%, respectively. School 
expenses refer to the cost of spending on school education activities at the “Article 1 schools,” as defined in Article 
1 of the School Education Act (1947), pertaining to levels from kindergarten to university. The direct beneficiaries 
of such school education are the students enrolled at each education level. General and administrative expenses 
include the costs required by the Board of Education and executive offices, educational work and private education 
institutional aid. Social education expenses include social-educational facilities such as libraries and museums, as 
well as the cost of social education activities. The direct benefits of general educational expenses and social-
educational expenses cover a wide-range, from the students in private schools to users of facilities—including the 
elderly. Thus, it is difficult to standardize the amount of expenditure according to specific beneficiaries as in the 
case of school expenses. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on school expenses that account for the lion’s share of 
local educational expenditure. 
Next we overview the expenditure data classified by the components. According to the “Local Educational 
Expense Survey,” educational expenditures by local governments can be classified into three categories: current 
expenditure composed mainly of payroll expenses; capital spending incurred mainly for fixed assets such as school 
buildings; and local government debt redemption expenses. Since it is reasonable to think that the amount of debt 
redemption expense is unlikely to reflect a voter’s preference, we decide to analyze current and capital expenditures 
instead. 
In FY2017, the total amount of current and capital expenditure is JPY275 billion for kindergartens, JPY 5,606 
billion for primary schools, JPY3,197 billion for junior high schools, and JPY2,525 billion for high schools, 
making primary schools the largest recipient of funding. Looking at the time-series trend from FY1979 (the earliest 
survey year available online) at each educational stage, the amount of educational expenditure had been increasing 
since the 1980s. The growth rate slowed at the dawn of the 1990s and was generally flat during that decade. After 
that, in the 2000s, kindergarten and primary schools showed a slightly decreasing trend, while junior high schools 
seemed to be nearly flat. As for high school, a decreasing trend is identified, but some portion of it (after 2014) 
showed an increasing trend. 
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(Source) “Local Educational Expense Survey”, “School Basic Survey.” 
Fig.2：Public educational expenditures 
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Educational expenditures per student in FY2017 is JPY1.02 million for kindergartens, JPY0.89 million for 
primary schools, JPY1.04 million for junior high schools, and JPY0.77 million for high schools, making junior 
high school the largest recipient. As for the number of students, the trend has clearly increased during the period 
of the second generation of baby boomers’ children. Since then, however, it has continued to decline until now. On 
the other hand, educational expenditure per student had been steadily increasing until the 1990s in all educational 
stages, implying that schoolroom educational costs per student has been increasing even while the number of 
children has been decreasing. In the 2000s, the trend showed a slight increase or was substantially flat; only 
kindergarten expenses per child started to increase again, at least after 2006. 
Fig.3 shows the breakdown of current expenditure by financing entity and character. Accordingly, almost 80% 
of the total amount is payroll expense at all educational stages. The other 20% are the costs required for classroom 
operations, i.e., “educational activities expense” such as education-related consumable materials, special activities, 
and business trips, along with “management expense,” e.g., repairs, security, purchases of consumable supplies, 
heating, and lighting costs. 
 
 (Kindergarten)                                (Primary school) 







 (Junior high school)                              (High school) 


 
 
 
 
 
(Source) “Local Educational Expense Survey.” 
Fig.3：Breakdown of current expenses (FY2017) 
 
Next, we investigate the main financing entities for each stage of education. Kindergarten and high school have 
been established and supervised by municipal boards of education and prefecture boards of education. Therefore, 
basically, a kindergarten’s finance falls under the responsibility of municipalities, while financing high schools 
falls under the responsibility of prefectures. As for primary and junior high schools, although they are established 
and supervised by municipal boards of education, both prefectures and municipalities finance their budgets. But 
as Fig.3 shows, the share of prefectures is higher than that of municipalities. This is because prefecture boards of 
education have authority to appoint teachers and other staff, and prefectures are in charge of paying their salaries. 
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(Source) “Local Educational Expense Survey”, “School Basic Survey.” 
Fig.2：Public educational expenditures 
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Educational expenditures per student in FY2017 is JPY1.02 million for kindergartens, JPY0.89 million for 
primary schools, JPY1.04 million for junior high schools, and JPY0.77 million for high schools, making junior 
high school the largest recipient. As for the number of students, the trend has clearly increased during the period 
of the second generation of baby boomers’ children. Since then, however, it has continued to decline until now. On 
the other hand, educational expenditure per student had been steadily increasing until the 1990s in all educational 
stages, implying that schoolroom educational costs per student has been increasing even while the number of 
children has been decreasing. In the 2000s, the trend showed a slight increase or was substantially flat; only 
kindergarten expenses per child started to increase again, at least after 2006. 
Fig.3 shows the breakdown of current expenditure by financing entity and character. Accordingly, almost 80% 
of the total amount is payroll expense at all educational stages. The other 20% are the costs required for classroom 
operations, i.e., “educational activities expense” such as education-related consumable materials, special activities, 
and business trips, along with “management expense,” e.g., repairs, security, purchases of consumable supplies, 
heating, and lighting costs. 
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(Source) “Local Educational Expense Survey.” 
Fig.3：Breakdown of current expenses (FY2017) 
 
Next, we investigate the main financing entities for each stage of education. Kindergarten and high school have 
been established and supervised by municipal boards of education and prefecture boards of education. Therefore, 
basically, a kindergarten’s finance falls under the responsibility of municipalities, while financing high schools 
falls under the responsibility of prefectures. As for primary and junior high schools, although they are established 
and supervised by municipal boards of education, both prefectures and municipalities finance their budgets. But 
as Fig.3 shows, the share of prefectures is higher than that of municipalities. This is because prefecture boards of 
education have authority to appoint teachers and other staff, and prefectures are in charge of paying their salaries. 
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In principle, school-related expenditures are supposed to be financed by municipalities, as specified in the Act on 
Sharing of Salaries for Personnel of Municipal Schools. However, to avoid the possible problem of disparity in 
educational levels between regions, due to dramatic differences in relative financial strength, prefectures whose 
financial power is less heterogeneous than a municipality takes responsibility of paying personnel expenses, which 
is called the Prefectural Subsidies for Teachers' Compensation System. Thus, the burden of current expenditure by 
a prefecture is larger than that by the municipality at the primary and junior high school levels. Furthermore, under 
the system of the National Treasury’s Sharing of Compulsory Education Expenses, the national government bears 
one-third of teacher and staff salaries, and prefectures bear the other two-thirds, which is also financed by the 
national government through LAT to the appropriate prefectures. Unlike primary and junior high school stages, 
national government subsidies for kindergartens and high schools accounts for only about 1% of total local school 
expenditures. In recent years, however, aligned with the growing demand to support students with special needs 
at each educational stage, the national government subsidizes a certain portion of costs for local governments that 
try to develop a favorable support system. 
Now we consider capital expenditure in detail. Fig.4 shows the breakdown of capital expenditure by financing 
entity and character. As indicated, “construction expense” occupies the largest share of total expenditures, e.g., the 
cost for extension or reconstruction of school buildings, gymnasiums, and libraries; labor costs for remodeling, 
material costs, and contracting costs. According to the “Local Educational Expense Survey,” projects like large-
scale repairs subject to national subsidies or local bond issuance, e.g., construction for disaster recovery and 
earthquake resistance, expanding the operational life of facilities, and projects that increase the value of facilities 
are regarded as capital expenditures.  
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(Source) “Local Educational Expense Survey.” 
Fig.4：Breakdown of capital expenses (FY2017) 
 
According to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology1, on April 1, 2017, 98.8% of 
public primary and junior high schools had completed earthquake-resistant reinforcement of their buildings. In 
more recent years, it is required to allocate the budget for improvement in educational environment to meet with 
changes in social situations, e.g., maintenance of aging buildings, equipping structures with air-conditioners, and 
installing barrier-free facilities. 
Pertaining to the financing entities, the share allocated to municipalities is larger than that of prefectures for 
kindergarten, primary, and junior high schools, since municipal boards of education have a responsibility to 
establish and supervise schools. Similarly, high schools are established and supervised by prefecture boards of 
education; prefectures have a larger share than that of a municipality. Compared to current expenditures, the share 
of local governments’ burden is not so large: nearly 50% of total capital expenditures. The other 50% consists of 
national subsidies and local bonds issued; and the share of local bonds issued accounts for about 40% for all 
educational stages. To provide an equal educational opportunity and improve country-wide educational levels, the 
national government covers a maximum one-half of capital expenses for public school facilities, especially for 
compulsory educational stages. Variance exists among educational levels, although national government subsidy 
accounts for nearly 20% in primary and junior high schools, it amounts to only 5% for high schools. 
Some previous research that investigated the relationship between aging and public educational expenditure 
with long-term time-series data showed that the relationship was not always constant through an estimation period 
and pointed out the possibility of structural changes during the covered periods. For example, Hoxby (1998) 
showed that aging and educational expenditures were positively correlated in the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century, but since then that positive impact has declined and eventually became negative in the 1990s. In Japan, 
Ohtake and Sano (2009), examined the relationship between aging and compulsory education expenditures using 
a prefectural level panel dataset during the period 1975 to 2005 statistically identified that the influence of aging 
on expenditure changed around 1993. They found a positive relationship before 1985, but negative after 1990. 
Miyaki and Kimura (2019) also statistically tested for structural breaks and divided the estimation periods into two 
phases, considering fiscal reforms concerning the intergovernmental relationships.2 As a result, the significant 
negative influence of aging on educational expenditure is more prominent in the latter phase of the estimation 
period than in the earlier phase, especially for lower educational stages Table 2. As for high school and university 
stages, the positive impact of aging on educational expenditure seems to have diminished during the latter phase 
of the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Refer to the website of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/zyosei/nyuumon.htm) 
2 For primary and junior high school, they consider a FY2004 fiscal reform introducing a new block-grant system toward the government subsidy 
for compulsory education and a FY2006 revision of the national treasury's obligatory share of compulsory education expenses. For universities they 
consider FY2004 fiscal reform of turning into independent administrative corporations and apply chow-tests to the data. As for kindergarten and 
high school stages, since there have not experienced any huge reform deserving special mention and due to some data constraint problems, they 
apply Supremum-Wald Test that is applicable to the data even when the period of structural change is not specified beforehand. 
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In principle, school-related expenditures are supposed to be financed by municipalities, as specified in the Act on 
Sharing of Salaries for Personnel of Municipal Schools. However, to avoid the possible problem of disparity in 
educational levels between regions, due to dramatic differences in relative financial strength, prefectures whose 
financial power is less heterogeneous than a municipality takes responsibility of paying personnel expenses, which 
is called the Prefectural Subsidies for Teachers' Compensation System. Thus, the burden of current expenditure by 
a prefecture is larger than that by the municipality at the primary and junior high school levels. Furthermore, under 
the system of the National Treasury’s Sharing of Compulsory Education Expenses, the national government bears 
one-third of teacher and staff salaries, and prefectures bear the other two-thirds, which is also financed by the 
national government through LAT to the appropriate prefectures. Unlike primary and junior high school stages, 
national government subsidies for kindergartens and high schools accounts for only about 1% of total local school 
expenditures. In recent years, however, aligned with the growing demand to support students with special needs 
at each educational stage, the national government subsidizes a certain portion of costs for local governments that 
try to develop a favorable support system. 
Now we consider capital expenditure in detail. Fig.4 shows the breakdown of capital expenditure by financing 
entity and character. As indicated, “construction expense” occupies the largest share of total expenditures, e.g., the 
cost for extension or reconstruction of school buildings, gymnasiums, and libraries; labor costs for remodeling, 
material costs, and contracting costs. According to the “Local Educational Expense Survey,” projects like large-
scale repairs subject to national subsidies or local bond issuance, e.g., construction for disaster recovery and 
earthquake resistance, expanding the operational life of facilities, and projects that increase the value of facilities 
are regarded as capital expenditures.  
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Fig.4：Breakdown of capital expenses (FY2017) 
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national subsidies and local bonds issued; and the share of local bonds issued accounts for about 40% for all 
educational stages. To provide an equal educational opportunity and improve country-wide educational levels, the 
national government covers a maximum one-half of capital expenses for public school facilities, especially for 
compulsory educational stages. Variance exists among educational levels, although national government subsidy 
accounts for nearly 20% in primary and junior high schools, it amounts to only 5% for high schools. 
Some previous research that investigated the relationship between aging and public educational expenditure 
with long-term time-series data showed that the relationship was not always constant through an estimation period 
and pointed out the possibility of structural changes during the covered periods. For example, Hoxby (1998) 
showed that aging and educational expenditures were positively correlated in the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century, but since then that positive impact has declined and eventually became negative in the 1990s. In Japan, 
Ohtake and Sano (2009), examined the relationship between aging and compulsory education expenditures using 
a prefectural level panel dataset during the period 1975 to 2005 statistically identified that the influence of aging 
on expenditure changed around 1993. They found a positive relationship before 1985, but negative after 1990. 
Miyaki and Kimura (2019) also statistically tested for structural breaks and divided the estimation periods into two 
phases, considering fiscal reforms concerning the intergovernmental relationships.2 As a result, the significant 
negative influence of aging on educational expenditure is more prominent in the latter phase of the estimation 
period than in the earlier phase, especially for lower educational stages Table 2. As for high school and university 
stages, the positive impact of aging on educational expenditure seems to have diminished during the latter phase 
of the period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Refer to the website of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/zyosei/nyuumon.htm) 
2 For primary and junior high school, they consider a FY2004 fiscal reform introducing a new block-grant system toward the government subsidy 
for compulsory education and a FY2006 revision of the national treasury's obligatory share of compulsory education expenses. For universities they 
consider FY2004 fiscal reform of turning into independent administrative corporations and apply chow-tests to the data. As for kindergarten and 
high school stages, since there have not experienced any huge reform deserving special mention and due to some data constraint problems, they 
apply Supremum-Wald Test that is applicable to the data even when the period of structural change is not specified beforehand. 
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Table 2: Impact of aging by educational stage: the evidence from Miyaki and Kimura(2019) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Note1) ＋ and － indicate positive and negative sign of coefficients of estimated parameters, respectively. 
(Note2) Parentheses indicate "not significant". + (or -), ++ (or --) and +++ (or ---) indicate each coefficient is significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(Note3) * indicates that Hansen-J statistic shows some instrument variables might not be exogenous. 
(Note4) Dynamic model applies Arellano Bond model. 
(Source) Miyaki and Kimura (2019). 
 
Based on the results of Ohtake and Sano (2009), it seems that the elderly evidence a rather passive attitude 
toward educational expenditures after 1990s they used to be. More precisely according to the greater detailed 
analysis by Miyaki and Kimura (2019), the elderly negatively support spendings in kindergarten, primary school, 
junior high school, high school and university after 1997, 2005, 2003, 2001 and 2004, respectively (Table 2). Thus, 
in this paper, we focused on the latter phase of the estimation period in Miyaki and Kimura (2019), and at each 
stage, we explored what specific components of educational expenditures the elderly were “unwilling” to support. 
This is important for policy making, so that one may grasp recent trends in the elderly’s preferences. The estimation 
period is from 1997 to 2014 for kindergarten, from 2005 to 2014 for primary schools, from 2003 to 2014 for junior 
high schools, and from 2001 to 2014 for high schools. We did not examine university education, since we cannot 
obtain university expenditure data by character due to data constraints.  
 
4. The analysis 
4.1: Estimation model 
First, we conduct a statistical test to check the stationarity of the independent and dependent variables. 
Specifically, we apply the LLC test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) and the IPS test (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) to 
the data, along with the Fisher-type test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) to unbalanced panel data. To ascertain the 
difference among those tests, we consider an AR(1) model as follows. Here i indicates prefecture and t indicates 
time. In all the tests, null hypothesis is that there is a unit root. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The LLC test assumes that a variable takes the same value for all prefectures both in the null and the alternative 
hypotheses, and that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 in the alternative hypothesis, 
        H0: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
        H1: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
On the other hand, the IPS test loses the assumption of the alternative hypothesis that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the same among all 
i. The value of  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 can be varied among each i, assuming 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 at least in one prefecture.  
        H0: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖47) 
             H1: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 for 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 𝑖𝑖), 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 + 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
Finally, a Fisher-type test has the same assumptions as an IPS test, but it applies a unit root test (ADF test or 
Educational stage Kindergarten Primary school Junior high school High school University 
Period ～1996 1997~ ～2004 2005～ ～2002 2003～ ～2000 2001～ ～2003 2004～ 
Static model (－) −− −−− (－) (－) −−− (－) (－) + (－) 
Dynamic model (＋) −− −− −−−＊ (＋) −−− +++ (＋)＊ + (－) 
 
Phillips-Perron test) to the individual i. The null hypothesis is examined using test statistics calculated by tallying 
up the obtained p-values. We confirmed that all the variables become stationary after taking the first difference. 
The analysis in this paper is based on the following model. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽65𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛅𝛅 + 𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Here 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the educational expenditure (current expenditure or capital expenditure) per student enrolled 
at each educational stage in i prefecture for fiscal year t. To analyze the amount of educational expenditure over 
which local governments have discretion, we subtracted the amount of national subsidy per student from current 
and capital expenditure per student spent by prefectures and municipalities and set them as dependent variables. 
The local governments’ present behavior would be more or less dependent on the behavior taken in the 
past. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 is the lagged dependent variable which considers this dynamic behavior of the local government. If 
the behavior of local public bodies was dynamic and the lag term of the dependent variable was not taken into 
account, the error term would be correlated with the dependent variable and the estimation results would be biased. 
Thus, dynamic models that consider past expenditure should be included in the first step of the analysis and, 
therefore, in this paper we applied dynamic panel analysis. 
Many previous studies suggested the dynamic behavior of government expenditure. Potrafke (2010) analyzed 
the relationship between state government expenditure allocation and government ideology in West Germany, 
applying a dynamic panel model for its robustness check. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) pointed out that the fiscal 
expenditure as dependent variable has strong autocorrelation. Jia et al. (2014) analyzed the influence of the 
decentralization progress of local governments on local fiscal expenditure, using a dynamic model to consider 
heterogeneity of local governments and adhesion to government expenditure. Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) 
analyzed municipal expenditures and revenue in Sweden, and found the one-year lagged dynamic behavior within 
the local public sector. Bergström, et al. (2004) also pointed out the importance of considering such behavior by 
the local government. Takahashi (2013), replicating Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) also pointed out that past 
expenditure affected current spending. In Japan, Akai, et al. (2003) suggested the possibility of soft budget 
constraints existing in the LAT system. Miyazaki (2007) pointed out that previous expenditure affected the 
correction factor in the process of LAT calculation, and under such circumstances local governments anticipate 
future national government relief in determining their current expenditure. In other words, past expenditures may 
affect present expenditure, and it is necessary to consider the dynamic behavior of the local governments. 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽65𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the ratio of population aged 65 and older, and 𝛽𝛽 is the estimated parameter. To deal with 
the possible endogeneity problem of the aging ratio, we considered the five-year lagged aging ratio as an 
instrument variable which is a real value obtainable from National Census. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the other independent 
variables that affect educational expenditures such as the ratio of the potential demander at each educational stage 
to the total population,3 the national subsidy per student, the number of schools in each educational stage, per 
capita income, and a financial capability indicator. The data for per capita income and the financial capability 
indicator represent the regional economy’s level and the local governments’ financial situations, respectively. And 
𝛅𝛅  is the vector of the estimated parameter. 𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝑖𝑖  indicates a trend term that eliminates the influence of 
                                                        
3 We calculated the number of the potential demander for each educational stage as follow. We can obtain one-year age data from the national 
census surveyed in every five years. We can also obtain five-year age group data every year from the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security. When the national census was taken, we calculate the division ratio of the age group that corresponds to the potential demander of each 
educational stage. Then, assuming that the division ratio will be constant until the next census, we calculate the potential number of demander using 
the ratio. 
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(Note1) ＋ and － indicate positive and negative sign of coefficients of estimated parameters, respectively. 
(Note2) Parentheses indicate "not significant". + (or -), ++ (or --) and +++ (or ---) indicate each coefficient is significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(Note3) * indicates that Hansen-J statistic shows some instrument variables might not be exogenous. 
(Note4) Dynamic model applies Arellano Bond model. 
(Source) Miyaki and Kimura (2019). 
 
Based on the results of Ohtake and Sano (2009), it seems that the elderly evidence a rather passive attitude 
toward educational expenditures after 1990s they used to be. More precisely according to the greater detailed 
analysis by Miyaki and Kimura (2019), the elderly negatively support spendings in kindergarten, primary school, 
junior high school, high school and university after 1997, 2005, 2003, 2001 and 2004, respectively (Table 2). Thus, 
in this paper, we focused on the latter phase of the estimation period in Miyaki and Kimura (2019), and at each 
stage, we explored what specific components of educational expenditures the elderly were “unwilling” to support. 
This is important for policy making, so that one may grasp recent trends in the elderly’s preferences. The estimation 
period is from 1997 to 2014 for kindergarten, from 2005 to 2014 for primary schools, from 2003 to 2014 for junior 
high schools, and from 2001 to 2014 for high schools. We did not examine university education, since we cannot 
obtain university expenditure data by character due to data constraints.  
 
4. The analysis 
4.1: Estimation model 
First, we conduct a statistical test to check the stationarity of the independent and dependent variables. 
Specifically, we apply the LLC test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) and the IPS test (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) to 
the data, along with the Fisher-type test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) to unbalanced panel data. To ascertain the 
difference among those tests, we consider an AR(1) model as follows. Here i indicates prefecture and t indicates 
time. In all the tests, null hypothesis is that there is a unit root. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The LLC test assumes that a variable takes the same value for all prefectures both in the null and the alternative 
hypotheses, and that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 in the alternative hypothesis, 
        H0: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
        H1: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
On the other hand, the IPS test loses the assumption of the alternative hypothesis that 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the same among all 
i. The value of  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 can be varied among each i, assuming 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 at least in one prefecture.  
        H0: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖47) 
             H1: 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 < 1 for 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 𝑖𝑖), 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 for 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖 + 1𝑖 𝑖𝑖 + 𝑖𝑖 𝑖 𝑖 47) 
Finally, a Fisher-type test has the same assumptions as an IPS test, but it applies a unit root test (ADF test or 
Educational stage Kindergarten Primary school Junior high school High school University 
Period ～1996 1997~ ～2004 2005～ ～2002 2003～ ～2000 2001～ ～2003 2004～ 
Static model (－) −− −−− (－) (－) −−− (－) (－) + (－) 
Dynamic model (＋) −− −− −−−＊ (＋) −−− +++ (＋)＊ + (－) 
 
Phillips-Perron test) to the individual i. The null hypothesis is examined using test statistics calculated by tallying 
up the obtained p-values. We confirmed that all the variables become stationary after taking the first difference. 
The analysis in this paper is based on the following model. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽65𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛅𝛅 + 𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Here 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the educational expenditure (current expenditure or capital expenditure) per student enrolled 
at each educational stage in i prefecture for fiscal year t. To analyze the amount of educational expenditure over 
which local governments have discretion, we subtracted the amount of national subsidy per student from current 
and capital expenditure per student spent by prefectures and municipalities and set them as dependent variables. 
The local governments’ present behavior would be more or less dependent on the behavior taken in the 
past. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 is the lagged dependent variable which considers this dynamic behavior of the local government. If 
the behavior of local public bodies was dynamic and the lag term of the dependent variable was not taken into 
account, the error term would be correlated with the dependent variable and the estimation results would be biased. 
Thus, dynamic models that consider past expenditure should be included in the first step of the analysis and, 
therefore, in this paper we applied dynamic panel analysis. 
Many previous studies suggested the dynamic behavior of government expenditure. Potrafke (2010) analyzed 
the relationship between state government expenditure allocation and government ideology in West Germany, 
applying a dynamic panel model for its robustness check. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) pointed out that the fiscal 
expenditure as dependent variable has strong autocorrelation. Jia et al. (2014) analyzed the influence of the 
decentralization progress of local governments on local fiscal expenditure, using a dynamic model to consider 
heterogeneity of local governments and adhesion to government expenditure. Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) 
analyzed municipal expenditures and revenue in Sweden, and found the one-year lagged dynamic behavior within 
the local public sector. Bergström, et al. (2004) also pointed out the importance of considering such behavior by 
the local government. Takahashi (2013), replicating Dahlberg and Johansson (2000) also pointed out that past 
expenditure affected current spending. In Japan, Akai, et al. (2003) suggested the possibility of soft budget 
constraints existing in the LAT system. Miyazaki (2007) pointed out that previous expenditure affected the 
correction factor in the process of LAT calculation, and under such circumstances local governments anticipate 
future national government relief in determining their current expenditure. In other words, past expenditures may 
affect present expenditure, and it is necessary to consider the dynamic behavior of the local governments. 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽65𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the ratio of population aged 65 and older, and 𝛽𝛽 is the estimated parameter. To deal with 
the possible endogeneity problem of the aging ratio, we considered the five-year lagged aging ratio as an 
instrument variable which is a real value obtainable from National Census. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the other independent 
variables that affect educational expenditures such as the ratio of the potential demander at each educational stage 
to the total population,3 the national subsidy per student, the number of schools in each educational stage, per 
capita income, and a financial capability indicator. The data for per capita income and the financial capability 
indicator represent the regional economy’s level and the local governments’ financial situations, respectively. And 
𝛅𝛅  is the vector of the estimated parameter. 𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝑖𝑖  indicates a trend term that eliminates the influence of 
                                                        
3 We calculated the number of the potential demander for each educational stage as follow. We can obtain one-year age data from the national 
census surveyed in every five years. We can also obtain five-year age group data every year from the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security. When the national census was taken, we calculate the division ratio of the age group that corresponds to the potential demander of each 
educational stage. Then, assuming that the division ratio will be constant until the next census, we calculate the potential number of demander using 
the ratio. 
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Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per student 658 yen 737,450 110,136 440,080 1,040,681
Capital expenditure per student 658 yen 74,715 46,841 9,956 355,034
National government disbursement per student (Current) 658 yen 1,331 5,021 0 65,716
National government disbursement per student (Capital) 658 yen 9,123 17,237 0 139,183
Ratio of a population aged 15 to 17 658 % 3.16 0.36 2.22 4.63
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 658 % 23.21 3.38 13.70 32.69
Number of public high school 658 83 51 24 282
Income per population 658 yen 2,842,341 487,858 1,982,184 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 658 0.46 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per child 846 yen 681,855 159,800 338,905 1,486,413
Capital expenditure per child 846 yen 64,062 70,879 877 725,066
National government disbursement per child (Current) 846 yen 5,658 21,960 0 352,975
National government disbursement per child (Capital) 846 yen 9,382 15,814 0 162,119
Ratio of a population aged 3 to 5 846 % 2.69 0.27 1.94 3.96
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 846 % 22.12 3.87 11.04 32.69
Number of public kindergaten 846 117 105 2 560
Income per population 846 yen 2,797,896 481,541 1,901,008 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 846 0.46 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per pupil 470 yen 665,737 89,972 469,494 944,719
Capital expenditure per pupil 470 yen 89,249 36,134 20,522 240,978
National government disbursement per pupil (Current) 470 yen 163,471 25,942 104,390 266,068
National government disbursement per pupil (Capital) 470 yen 32,754 20,906 4,230 117,180
Ratio of a population aged 6 to 11 470 % 5.47 0.41 4.41 7.47
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 470 % 24.29 2.98 15.91 32.69
Number of public primary school 470 463 279 134 1,401
Income per population 470 yen 2,896,047 485,385 2,011,684 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 470 0.48 0.20 0.21 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per student 564 yen 707,673 110,611 468,648 1,140,962
Capital expenditure per student 564 yen 108,535 53,231 18,954 438,279
National government disbursement per student (Current) 564 yen 201,317 39,356 130,006 414,974
National government disbursement per student (Capital) 564 yen 36,709 26,860 124 219,820
Ratio of a population aged 12 to 14 564 % 2.88 0.21 2.21 3.97
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 564 % 23.73 3.18 15.04 32.69
Number of public primary school 564 214 137 60 724
Income per population 564 yen 2,873,287 487,256 2,004,735 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 564 0.47 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
macroeconomic shock on educational expenditures, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  indicates unobservable heterogeneity of prefectures 
unchanged over time, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates a stochastic error term. All variables are logarithmically transformed. 
Note that price data is deflated using the GDP deflator and transformed into its natural logarithm. As for descriptive 
statistics of the variables, refer to Table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
（Kindergarten）＜FY1997～2014＞ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
（Primary school）＜FY2005～2014＞ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
（Junior high school）＜FY2003～2014＞ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
（High school）＜FY2001～2014＞ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned before, when the first difference of each variable is taken, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
1% significance level, and stationary data is obtained. In this chapter we estimate the following model. The 
individual effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is eliminated in this difference model, 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽65𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛅𝛅 + 𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝛅𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Since the logarithm difference is taken, the above equation captures movement in the rate of change. However, 
as Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 and Δ𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are correlated with each other, the consistency of the estimator is satisfied neither in the 
normal fixed-effect model nor the generalized least squares model. In order to solve this problem, we use an 
estimation method based on first difference generalized momentum method (GMM) (Arellano and Bond <1991>, 
hereinafter call A-B model).  
As another dynamic model, Anderson and Hsiao (1982)’s two-step least squares method (hereinafter called the 
A-H model) may be cited, but there are advantages and disadvantages of using this method depending on the 
characteristics of the sample size. The A-H model calculates a consistent estimator by instrumental variables, thus 
providing a consistent estimator for the GMM. According to Takahashi (2013), in studies with a sufficiently large 
cross-sectional data and sufficiently small time-series data, the GMM estimator in the A-B model is more effective 
than the estimator under a two stage least squares method of the A-H model. In the A-B model, the GMM objective 
function is defined by using the following moment condition, with an unknown parameter estimated by 
instrumental variables satisfying 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠. 
      𝛅𝛅𝐸𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∆𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 0𝑖 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑖 𝑠𝑠 = 0𝑖𝑡 𝑖 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠 
      𝛅𝛅𝐸∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∆𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 0𝑖 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑖 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑖 𝑡𝑡 
According to Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2005); and Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (2002), the increase of 
the lag period as instrumental variables in the GMM estimation could lead to finding a more effective estimator, 
but imposing too many orthogonal conditions yields problems; and empirically, downward bias also increases. The 
term of our analysis data is at least ten years, even in the primary school dataset (which has the shortest period), 
and if the lag period(s) of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠 as an instrumental variable is not specified, the number of instrumental 
variables becomes very large. Empirically, it is desirable that the number of instrumental variables is smaller than 
the number of cross-section individuals. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a higher order lag period additionally 
when the two lags of the endogenous variable are taken as the instrumental variable (s = 2) and they do not satisfy 
the orthogonal condition of the instrumental variable. 
In both models, obtaining a consistent estimator without serial correlation in the error term is an important 
assumption underlying GMM estimation. Thus in this paper, we test serial correlation against the error term of the 
first difference. If the first-order autocorrelation is significant and the second-order autocorrelation is not 
significant, the original error term is uncorrelated. 
 
4.2: Estimation results and interpretation 
Detailed results of estimations and tests are shown in the reference table, while a brief version summarizing the 
effects of aging is shown in Table 4. We also show the estimation results of the static model for reference which 
does not consider the lagged dependent variable. Note that we solve the possible endogeneity problem of the aging 
ratio in the static model, too. 
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Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per student 658 yen 737,450 110,136 440,080 1,040,681
Capital expenditure per student 658 yen 74,715 46,841 9,956 355,034
National government disbursement per student (Current) 658 yen 1,331 5,021 0 65,716
National government disbursement per student (Capital) 658 yen 9,123 17,237 0 139,183
Ratio of a population aged 15 to 17 658 % 3.16 0.36 2.22 4.63
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 658 % 23.21 3.38 13.70 32.69
Number of public high school 658 83 51 24 282
Income per population 658 yen 2,842,341 487,858 1,982,184 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 658 0.46 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per child 846 yen 681,855 159,800 338,905 1,486,413
Capital expenditure per child 846 yen 64,062 70,879 877 725,066
National government disbursement per child (Current) 846 yen 5,658 21,960 0 352,975
National government disbursement per child (Capital) 846 yen 9,382 15,814 0 162,119
Ratio of a population aged 3 to 5 846 % 2.69 0.27 1.94 3.96
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 846 % 22.12 3.87 11.04 32.69
Number of public kindergaten 846 117 105 2 560
Income per population 846 yen 2,797,896 481,541 1,901,008 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 846 0.46 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per pupil 470 yen 665,737 89,972 469,494 944,719
Capital expenditure per pupil 470 yen 89,249 36,134 20,522 240,978
National government disbursement per pupil (Current) 470 yen 163,471 25,942 104,390 266,068
National government disbursement per pupil (Capital) 470 yen 32,754 20,906 4,230 117,180
Ratio of a population aged 6 to 11 470 % 5.47 0.41 4.41 7.47
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 470 % 24.29 2.98 15.91 32.69
Number of public primary school 470 463 279 134 1,401
Income per population 470 yen 2,896,047 485,385 2,011,684 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 470 0.48 0.20 0.21 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Variable Sample Unit Average Std. dev Min Max
Current expenditure per student 564 yen 707,673 110,611 468,648 1,140,962
Capital expenditure per student 564 yen 108,535 53,231 18,954 438,279
National government disbursement per student (Current) 564 yen 201,317 39,356 130,006 414,974
National government disbursement per student (Capital) 564 yen 36,709 26,860 124 219,820
Ratio of a population aged 12 to 14 564 % 2.88 0.21 2.21 3.97
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older 564 % 23.73 3.18 15.04 32.69
Number of public primary school 564 214 137 60 724
Income per population 564 yen 2,873,287 487,256 2,004,735 5,431,468
Financial capability indicator 564 0.47 0.20 0.20 1.41
Independent variable
Dependent variable
macroeconomic shock on educational expenditures, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  indicates unobservable heterogeneity of prefectures 
unchanged over time, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates a stochastic error term. All variables are logarithmically transformed. 
Note that price data is deflated using the GDP deflator and transformed into its natural logarithm. As for descriptive 
statistics of the variables, refer to Table 3. 
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As mentioned before, when the first difference of each variable is taken, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
1% significance level, and stationary data is obtained. In this chapter we estimate the following model. The 
individual effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is eliminated in this difference model, 
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Since the logarithm difference is taken, the above equation captures movement in the rate of change. However, 
as Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 and Δ𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are correlated with each other, the consistency of the estimator is satisfied neither in the 
normal fixed-effect model nor the generalized least squares model. In order to solve this problem, we use an 
estimation method based on first difference generalized momentum method (GMM) (Arellano and Bond <1991>, 
hereinafter call A-B model).  
As another dynamic model, Anderson and Hsiao (1982)’s two-step least squares method (hereinafter called the 
A-H model) may be cited, but there are advantages and disadvantages of using this method depending on the 
characteristics of the sample size. The A-H model calculates a consistent estimator by instrumental variables, thus 
providing a consistent estimator for the GMM. According to Takahashi (2013), in studies with a sufficiently large 
cross-sectional data and sufficiently small time-series data, the GMM estimator in the A-B model is more effective 
than the estimator under a two stage least squares method of the A-H model. In the A-B model, the GMM objective 
function is defined by using the following moment condition, with an unknown parameter estimated by 
instrumental variables satisfying 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠. 
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According to Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2005); and Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (2002), the increase of 
the lag period as instrumental variables in the GMM estimation could lead to finding a more effective estimator, 
but imposing too many orthogonal conditions yields problems; and empirically, downward bias also increases. The 
term of our analysis data is at least ten years, even in the primary school dataset (which has the shortest period), 
and if the lag period(s) of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠𝑠 𝑠 𝑠 as an instrumental variable is not specified, the number of instrumental 
variables becomes very large. Empirically, it is desirable that the number of instrumental variables is smaller than 
the number of cross-section individuals. Therefore, in this paper, we consider a higher order lag period additionally 
when the two lags of the endogenous variable are taken as the instrumental variable (s = 2) and they do not satisfy 
the orthogonal condition of the instrumental variable. 
In both models, obtaining a consistent estimator without serial correlation in the error term is an important 
assumption underlying GMM estimation. Thus in this paper, we test serial correlation against the error term of the 
first difference. If the first-order autocorrelation is significant and the second-order autocorrelation is not 
significant, the original error term is uncorrelated. 
 
4.2: Estimation results and interpretation 
Detailed results of estimations and tests are shown in the reference table, while a brief version summarizing the 
effects of aging is shown in Table 4. We also show the estimation results of the static model for reference which 
does not consider the lagged dependent variable. Note that we solve the possible endogeneity problem of the aging 
ratio in the static model, too. 
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Table 4: Estimation results (A brief version) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Note1) ＋ and － indicate positive and negative sign of coefficients of estimated parameters, respectively. 
(Note2) Parentheses indicate "not significant". + (or -), ++ (or --) and +++ (or ---) indicate each coefficient is significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(Note3) Dynamic model applies Arellano Bond model. 
 
Hereafter, we mainly discuss the results obtained through the dynamic model that incorporates the dynamic 
behavior of local governments. According to Miyaki and Kimura (2019), aging showed a negative and significant 
correlation with educational expenditures of kindergarten, primary, and junior high schools in the covered period, 
as shown in Table 2. As a result of the estimations by character conducted in this paper, current expenditures were 
found to be negatively correlated with aging in all of the estimates. As for high schools, although estimates using 
the total amount of expenditures were insignificant in Miyaki and Kimura (2019), through estimations by character, 
current expenditures showed a negative and significant relationship with aging as well as with the results obtained 
at other educational stages. Based on the foregoing results, a recent trend can be identified that the elderly are not 
likely to support an increase in current expenditures wherein personnel costs constitute a considerable fraction, at 
any educational level. The effect of aging on capital expenditure was not statistically significant at the kindergarten 
and primary school stages; however, it was a positive and significant for junior high and high school, which came 
out with the opposite result through the estimates of current expenditure. One might point out that an aging 
population supports such capital expenditure, which consists of construction costs mostly. The coefficient obtained 
from the estimation at primary schools was also positive, although the result was not statistically significant. 
Pertaining to the results of other independent variables: Lagged educational expenditure turned out to be positive 
and significant in general, which suggested possible dynamic behavior of local governments. In greater detail, 
current expenditure showed a positive coefficient at the 1% significance level for primary, junior high, and high 
schools, while capital expenditure showed a positive coefficient at the 1% significance level at kindergarten and 
high school levels, being 10% significant but still positive at the primary school level, and insignificant at the 
junior high school one. The national subsidy showed different results depending on the character of the expenditure. 
Specifically, its effect on the current expenditure was negative and significant for primary, junior high, and high 
schools, while its effect on capital expenditure was positive and significant at kindergarten, primary, and junior 
high schools. The national subsidy is hypothesized to positively correlate with local expenditure, since it is a grant 
that the national government provides to local municipalities in order to encourage them to implement specific 
administrative projects. Despite the above-mentioned original purpose, national subsidies were found to have a 
negative relationship with current expenditures. 
We attribute the results of the primary and junior high school cases to the fiscal relationship between the national 
government and prefectures on personnel cost that constitutes a considerable fraction of current expenditures. 
When a prefecture is driven to reduce the number of teachers and staff, or their salaries (due to fiscal constraint) 
and as a consequence the amount spent on payroll falls below the base amount mandated by the national 
government, it will receive the reduced amount of the national subsidy that covers one-third of total personnel 
Educational stage Kindergarten Primary school Junior high school High school 
Character Current  Capital Current  Capital Current  Capital Current  Capital 
Static model （－） （－） （＋） （＋） － （－） （＋） （＋） 
Dynamic model －－ （－） －－－ （＋） －－－ ＋ － ＋ 
 
costs. But the remaining two-thirds is the amount distributed through the LAT in the general-purpose budget. 
Hence, when the prefecture in question spends more on other education-related expenditures than payroll in excess 
of the reduced payroll for teaching staffs, a negative relationship between the national subsidy granted and the 
local governments’ current expenditures was observed. 
Another possible channel of the national subsidy’s negative impact on current expenditures might be related to 
a recent movement in the financing entity at the primary and junior high school stages. In FY2003, a new system 
wherein municipalities may employ teachers and staffs with their own general budgets was introduced as a trial in 
designated structural reform districts. Since the Act on Sharing of Salaries for Personnel of Municipal Schools was 
amended in FY2006, this system has applied to all Japanese municipalities. By increasing municipal discretion, 
the number of teachers and other staff hired with a municipality’s own financial resources has been increasing. 
Kawakami (2015) conducted a detailed survey about the structure of teachers and staff in public primary and junior 
high school in the Saga prefecture, and found that the appointment of teachers and staffs by municipalities—i.e., 
part-time teachers, morals tutors, and school staff for students with special needs and food service operations has 
been on the rise. Thus, even when a prefecture reduces salaries which leads to reducing the national subsidy, 
municipalities may employ teachers and staffs complementally with their own financial resources to sustain and 
improve the quality of education. As a result, local governments’ total amount available for current expenditure is 
boosted. This kind of employment by municipal governments on their own would be affected, for example, by the 
fiscal treatment under them. That is, toward the employment of school staffs in charge of special support education, 
local governments’ fiscal treatment regarding the recruitment of assistant staff for special support education began 
for kindergarten in FY 2009, for primary and junior high schools in FY 2007, and for high schools in FY 2011. 
The number of schools was not statistically significant except for the capital expenditure for kindergarten and 
the current expenditure for high schools. The potential number of demanders had statistically significant and 
positive coefficients for current expenditures on primary and junior high schools and, on capital expenditures for 
junior high and high schools, while no economies of scale could be confirmed when estimations were conducted 
by character. Per capita income was positive and statistically significant except for current expenditures for 
preschools. Hence, educational expenditures in the municipalities with robust economic conditions have a high 
tendency to be increased regardless of the purpose. 
The financial capability indicator showed mixed results for the different educational stages in Miyaki and 
Kimura (2019), with positive and significant coefficients for current expenditure and, negative and significant 
coefficients on capital expenditure given estimations by character. As Auchi (2016) pointed out4, the recent trend 
is for municipalities that are rich in financial resources to employ part-time teachers, proactively utilizing the 
expanded discretion of local governments as explained above. Although the result that financially rich 
municipalities would increase their current expenditures was presumed, it could have been influenced by the 
administration reform of the incorporation of national universities in FY 2004. The salary of local public officers 
used to be similar to national public officers due to a stipulation in the Special Act for Education Personnel (Act 
No. 1 of 1949). This stipulation, however, has been removed since teaching staff found in national schools became 
nonpublic officers in conjunction with the incorporation of national universities, making the salaries of the teaching 
staffs of public schools came determined through prefectural ordinances (according to Article 13 of the Special 
                                                        
4 He points out that one of the characteristics of municipalities which employ part time teachers with their own financial resource is high financial 
capability indicator. 
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Table 4: Estimation results (A brief version) 
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at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
(Note3) Dynamic model applies Arellano Bond model. 
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Act for Education Personnel). After this change, personnel costs, which constitute 80 % of current expenditure, 
were more influenced by the fiscal situation of local governments. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Japan’s rapidly aging population has been increasing its share of qualified voters and its influence in political 
decision-making process. Thus, it is increasingly important to consider the allocation of government expenditures 
by investigating the preferences of the elderly population with respect to government expenditures. This paper 
investigated the effect of population aging on local public educational expenditures by conducting a dynamic panel 
estimation focusing on educational stages and characteristics of expenditures, so as to provide administrative staff 
in local governments with helpful information when they discuss how to allocate the limited financial resources 
designated for public education. 
According to the estimation results, after the latter half of the 1990s, the elderly population would not support 
an increase in current expenditures for every educational stage from kindergarten to high school. This result 
highlights the preferences of the elderly population that restrain expenditures for consumption purposes including 
payroll. When policy makers try to increase current expenses such as payrolls in order to improve educational 
quality, even more careful explanation might be needed to understand the elderly whose influence in the political 
decision-making process has been increasing. A decrease in educational expenditures, especially in payroll, might 
lead to the deterioration in educational quality over the long run. However, local governments do not just decrease 
payroll costs when looking at the contents of current expenditure. As we stated earlier, local municipalities have 
been gradually given discretion over the employment types of teaching staffs; thus financially rich cities, villages, 
and townships would deal with the deterioration problem on their own by employing part-time teaching staffs or 
other school staff members. 
On the other hand, the elderly population would support capital expenditures for junior high and high school 
stages after the latter half of the 1990s. This result suggests the elderly mainly support construction expenses 
resulting in tangible infrastructures. Based on capitalization theory, such infrastructures appreciate asset value 
which might lead to the elderly’s positive attitude toward capital expenditure. But it is important to note that 
construction expenses have changed from construction, expansion, and renovation of buildings, through 
reinforcement of buildings against earthquakes, to installment of air-conditioners and barrier-free facilities etc., in 
response to recent needs for improvement of educational environments. 
This study performs an analysis assuming the validity of the median voter theory, which has been employed in 
previous studies such as Poterba (1997, 1998) and Hoxby (1998). In the United States, it is reasonable to build an 
analytical model using the median voter theory since it adopts a decentralized system to decide local educational 
expenditures. In Japan, however, although local education boards are responsible for the administrative affairs of 
education in terms of political neutrality and stability, financial authority to accomplish effective and balanced 
municipal operations belongs to the governor. Therefore, the council decides all local governmental expenditures, 
including educational expenses. This situation implies that applying the median voter theory to an analysis of local 
educational expenditures in Japan might be inadequate. Previous studies have empirically demonstrated the 
validity of the median voter theory for total governmental expenditures (Doi, 2000) or for each item of local 
government expenses (Nagamine and Okui, 1999; Takahashi and Miyamoto, 2014) in Japan. However, no previous 
investigation has been performed regarding educational expenditures; this remains an issue to be solved in the 
future. 
Although this study only covered public educational expenditures due to data limitations, in future research we 
will discuss what a society-wide optimum might look like in terms of educational expenditure, by conducting a 
comprehensive analysis that utilizes private educational expenditures, including subsidies to private schools, as 
well as household expenditure. Besides, in this study we are implicitly assuming that elderly are uniform but to be 
precise, they differ vastly in terms of education, income, wealth, etc. We also need to take behaviors of different 
groups of the elderly into account to investigate the impact of aging on public expenditures. 
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previous studies such as Poterba (1997, 1998) and Hoxby (1998). In the United States, it is reasonable to build an 
analytical model using the median voter theory since it adopts a decentralized system to decide local educational 
expenditures. In Japan, however, although local education boards are responsible for the administrative affairs of 
education in terms of political neutrality and stability, financial authority to accomplish effective and balanced 
municipal operations belongs to the governor. Therefore, the council decides all local governmental expenditures, 
including educational expenses. This situation implies that applying the median voter theory to an analysis of local 
educational expenditures in Japan might be inadequate. Previous studies have empirically demonstrated the 
validity of the median voter theory for total governmental expenditures (Doi, 2000) or for each item of local 
government expenses (Nagamine and Okui, 1999; Takahashi and Miyamoto, 2014) in Japan. However, no previous 
investigation has been performed regarding educational expenditures; this remains an issue to be solved in the 
future. 
Although this study only covered public educational expenditures due to data limitations, in future research we 
will discuss what a society-wide optimum might look like in terms of educational expenditure, by conducting a 
comprehensive analysis that utilizes private educational expenditures, including subsidies to private schools, as 
well as household expenditure. Besides, in this study we are implicitly assuming that elderly are uniform but to be 
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Model
Character
-0.439 -7.035 -0.757 ** -0.691
(0.315) (4.390) (0.320) (2.097)
0.158 0.263 ***
(0.177) (0.047)
0.009 *** 0.358 *** 0.008 0.404 ***
(0.003) (0.024) (0.005) (0.030)
0.004 1.936 *** -0.02 1.527 **
(0.054) (0.421) (0.069) (0.683)
-0.378 ** 1.629 -0.243 -2.208
(0.182) (2.601) (0.329) (1.671)
0.090 ** -1.308 ** 0.086 ** -0.795 **
(0.045) (0.645) (0.037) (0.313)
0.067 1.924 ** 0.001 2.855 ***
(0.066) (0.796) (0.078) (0.736)
0.000 0.012 ** 0.036 *** 0.004
(0.000) (0.005) (0.009) (0.073)
0.158 -23.86 **
(0.833) (10.65)
Obs. 846 842 846 840
R-squared 0.052 0.322
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 119.924 *** 121.184 ***
Test of AR(1) -2.29 *** -5.27 ***
Test of AR(2) 0.67 0.41
Hansen J statistic (p-value)
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older
National government disbursement per child
Number of public kindergaten
Ratio of a population aged 3 to 5
Financial capability indicator
Kindergarten expenditure per child (t-1)
just identified just identified 0.988 0.995
Income per population
Year
Constant term
Static Arellano - Bond
Current Capital Current Capital
Model
Character
0.119 2.783 -0.714 *** 1.130
(0.260) (1.981) (0.129) (0.738)
0.364 *** 0.131 *
(0.052) (0.066)
-0.121 *** 0.350 *** -0.190 *** 0.345 ***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.035)
-0.042 (0.047) 0.057 0.138
(0.118) (0.762) (0.098) (0.474)
0.438 *** 0.622 0.647 *** -0.792
(0.153) (1.081) (0.157) (0.865)
-0.060 -1.100 *** (0.038) -1.322 ***
(0.052) (0.391) (0.044) (0.185)
0.360 *** 0.754 ** 0.301 *** 1.399 ***
(0.049) (0.319) (0.056) (0.227)
-0.005 *** 0.010 0.030 *** -0.011
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.025)
11.030 *** -21.85
(2.268) (13.51)
Obs. 470 470 470 470
R-squared 0.438 0.360
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 50.141 *** 50.763 ***
Test of AR(1) -3.51 *** -4.85 ***
Test of AR(2) 0.96 0.72
Hansen J statistic  (p-value)
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National government disbursement per pupil
Number of public primary school
Ratio of a population aged 6 to 11
Financial capability indicator
Kindergarten expenditure per pupil (t-1)
just identified just identified 0.331 0.196
Income per population
Year
Constant term
Static Arellano - Bond
Current Capital Current Capital
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Model
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(0.219) (2.043) (0.151) (0.833)
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(0.063) (0.054)
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(0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
0.173 1.637 0.132 0.649
(0.135) (1.108) (0.161) (1.093)
0.164 *** 0.461 0.103 * 0.839 *
(0.050) (0.471) (0.057) (0.444)
0.020 -0.206 -0.040 -1.063 ***
(0.039) (0.384) (0.047) (0.210)
0.352 *** 0.547 0.364 *** 1.003 ***
(0.046) (0.361) (0.052) (0.334)
-0.004 *** 0.015 *** 0.023 *** 0.001
0.000 (0.004) (0.004) (0.021)
8.834 *** -31.40 ***
(1.286) (8.794)
Obs. 564 564 564 564
R-squared 0.488 0.326
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Financial capability indicator
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Income per population
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0.484 *** 0.227 ***
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0.484 *** 0.227 ***
(0.055) (0.077)
-0.005 * 0.0168 -0.008 * 0.029
(0.002) (0.020) (0.004) (0.027)
0.147 *** 0.862 0.196 *** 0.808
(0.050) (0.738) (0.059) (0.616)
0.156 *** 0.876 -0.016 1.300 ***
(0.046) (0.605) (0.034) (0.470)
0.111 *** -0.518 0.116 *** -0.482
(0.030) (0.402) (0.023) (0.331)
0.197 *** 0.839 0.322 *** 1.151 **
(0.043) (0.529) (0.045) (0.472)
-0.002 *** 0.006 0.006 *** (0.040)
0.000 (0.004) (0.002) (0.036)
4.040 *** -12.41
(0.761) (9.245)
Obs. 658 658 658 658
R-squared 0.133 0.032
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 93.889 *** 89.62 ***
Test of AR(1) -4.09 ** -4.9 ***
Test of AR(2) -0.07 * 0.83
Hansen J statistic  (p-value)
National government disbursement per student
Static Arellano - Bond
Current Capital Current Capital
Ratio of a population aged 65 and older
High school expenses per student (t-1)
0.9020.791
Number of public high school
Ratio of a population aged 15 to 17
Financial capability indicator
Income per population
Year
Constant term
just identified just identified
Junior high school 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High school 
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